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Introduction: Angelo and the History of  Insurance and Bills
It is an honour and a privilege to be asked to give this Law Agency Lecture 
in commemoration and celebration of  Angelo Forte.1 I fi rst met him in 1980, 
in Glasgow at a gathering which he and David Fergus had initiated to discuss 
setting up a Scottish Legal History Group. The success of  that idea can be 
measured by noting that the Group continues to meet annually, having held 
its fi rst conference in 1981. Re-reading much of  Angelo’s published work in 
preparation for this event has brought back so much else: our time as colleagues 
in Edinburgh, our collaboration in authorship, our mutual editing of  each 
other’s work, going to innumerable conferences and meetings together, acting 
as each other’s external examiner at every level of  study, and, above all, lots 
1 This is a revised and expanded version of  the Law Agency Lecture delivered at 
Aberdeen on 8 March 2013. I have however sought to maintain the style and 
tone of  a lecture as this paper is meant more to prompt further questions than to 
formulate defi nitive answers. My researches owe much to the English and Scottish 
Law Commission teams working on the Commissions’ joint project on insurance 
law and also, separately, on consumer law. The following frequently cited works are 
usually referenced in their most recent edition or reprint: James Dalrymple Viscount 
Stair, Institutions of  the Law of  Scotland (6th edn, Edinburgh, 1981); William Forbes, 
Institutes of  the Law of  Scotland 1722–1730 (Edinburgh, 2012); Andrew McDouall 
Lord Bankton, An Institute of  the Law of  Scotland 1751-–3 (3 vols, Edinburgh, 1993–5); 
John Erskine, An Institute of  the Law of  Scotland (8th edn, 1871; Edinburgh, 1989); 
George Joseph Bell, Commentaries on the Law of  Scotland and on the Principles of  Mercantile 
Jurisprudence (7th edn, 1870; Edinburgh, 1990); idem, Principles of  the Law of  Scotland 
(4th edn, 1839; Edinburgh, 2010). This is generally because the edition or reprint in 
question reproduces the text in the form last given to it by the author. With Forbes’ 
Institutes, citations are to the page number of  the reprinted edition, in preference to 
using the appallingly complex reference system that he himself  devised; further, the 
easiest way into the MS. of  his Great Body of  the Law of  Scotland as presented online at 
http://www.forbes.gla.ac.uk/contents/ (accessed 22 March 2016) is by its foliation.
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of  enjoyable and stimulating conversations about law, history and much else 
besides, all refl ecting our many over-lapping enthusiasms. Perhaps we bonded 
most in the late 1980s, however, when we took our daughters, each pre-school 
and much the same age, to Christmas pantomimes at the King’s Theatre in 
Edinburgh, there to mortify them both by our exuberant over-engagement 
with demands from the stage for audience participation. 
One area where I must admit our interests did not overlap much if  at all 
was to ‘go down to the sea in ships [and] do business in great waters’.2 But even 
as one who tends to turn green at the very thought of  setting foot on any sea-
going vessel bigger than a motor-launch, I did fi nd enthralling Angelo’s vivid 
descriptions of  his days as a crewman on fi shing boats in the stormy waters 
of  the North Sea and beyond. His enthusiasm and excitement about boats 
and the sea carried over, as I will try to show in a moment, into his academic 
research, and also into the public presentations of  its results. I will never forget 
the relish with which he informed a bemused audience – the January 1998 
Conference of  Scottish Medievalists – that Polynesian sailors on inter-island 
voyages in the Pacifi c detected wave rhythms by the swing of  their testicles.3 I 
believe that Angelo was principally responsible for the chapter on ‘Sailing the 
North Atlantic’ in the co-authored book Viking Empires; certainly much of  it 
is underpinned by personal observation and knowledge of  how small wooden 
boats and their crews behave on the open sea. Swinging Polynesian testicles 
appear again, albeit this time accompanied by the wry comment that ‘We must 
discount this possible means [of  navigation] in more northerly climes.’4
Angelo’s passion for boats and the sea above all informed his interests 
in the law, especially commercial law, and its history. Ships and other vessels 
have been of  central importance to commerce from time immemorial; not 
just across the seas, moreover, but also on inland waters. It is no coincidence 
that most of  Europe’s major cities are either ports or places with ready access 
to signifi cant rivers, or both. Until the last couple of  centuries, carriage of  
goods by land for any distance was at best a much slower and more laborious 
business than doing so by water; and more could be carried in the latter way 
as well. The early products of  the Industrial Revolution reached their markets 
 2 Psalms, 107, 23.
 3 In the published version this information is discreetly tucked away in a footnote: 
Angelo D. M. Forte, ‘“Kenning be Kenning and Course be Course”: Maritime 
Jurimetrics in Scotland and Northern Europe 1400-1600’, Edinburgh Law Review, 2 
(1998), 56–88, 65, fn. 49. 
 4 Forte, Richard Oram and Frederik Pedersen, Viking Empires (Cambridge, 2005), 346, 
fn. 60.  
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by canal, and only the successive comings of  the railway line, tarmacadam, 
the internal combustion engine and powered fl ight transformed the position 
overland. Even now, however, as a visit to any modern container port will 
readily confi rm, carriage of  goods by sea remains a critical part of  the global 
economy.
It was not so much the law of  carriage by sea that Angelo focused on, 
however, even though he did touch upon it more than once in his writings, 
in both contemporary and historical settings. He was, of  course, interested 
by the law of  contract, which applies throughout commercial law, and this 
includes the hire, or chartering, of  ships and the placing of  goods on board 
them for carriage from one place to another. But amongst the several kinds of  
commercial contract he gave most attention to the law of  insurance contracts. 
This was linked, I think, to various other interests: problems of  risk generally; 
the use of  standard form contracts and their concomitant, the regulation of  
unfair contract terms; and the gap between what the law appeared to say and 
its operation in practice under various ‘soft law’ devices provided through the 
insurance industry itself. But at least in part his interest may also have been 
connected with the signifi cance of  insurance in shipping transactions, and the 
fact that the governing statute on the subject in the United Kingdom was (and 
still is, at the time of  writing) the Marine Insurance Act 1906, c.41.5 A crucial 
invariable of  ships transporting goods across the seas is risk, both to the ship 
itself  and to the goods being carried; insurance is, and has been for a long 
time, the most important way of  laying off  those risks for those who would 
otherwise have to bear the losses should any of  them materialise.  
Angelo’s fi rst major historical study, published in 1987, confi rmed the 
unsurprising fact that maritime commerce provided the initial setting for 
the use of  insurance in Scotland.6 Where he broke new ground was in an 
argument that, under Dutch rather than English infl uences, insurance began 
to be Scottish merchants’ preferred method of  allocating risk in the latter part 
of  the seventeenth century and became widespread in the eighteenth, even 
although case law did not really emerge in any signifi cant quantity in the Court 
of  Session until after 1780. The fi rst Scottish book on the subject, Elements of  
 5 Note however the Consumer Insurance (Disclosure and Representations) Act 
2012, c.6, which modifi es the 1906 Act considerably in its application to consumer 
insureds. Further, more wide-ranging, reform was brought about by the passage of  
the Insurance Act 2015 but still much of  the 1906 Act remains intact.
 6 Forte, ‘Marine Insurance and Risk Distribution in Scotland before 1800’, Law and 
History Review, 5 (1987), 393–412. 
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the Law Relating to Insurances by John Millar junior, also appeared as late as 1787.7 
Angelo’s article might have been timed to mark a bicentenary, but I think it 
was in fact coincidence! Whatever the truth of  the matter, the study laid the 
basis for continuing work on the history of  insurance law in Scotland over the 
next two decades, and also led Angelo ultimately to rather wider conclusions 
about the development of  commercial law in Scotland, particularly in the vital 
century after the Anglo-Scottish Union of  1707.8
The most interesting fi nding published in these subsequent papers was the 
Court of  Session’s practice, documented by Angelo from cases between 1774 
and 1808, of  seeking the opinion of  ‘eminent English counsel’ specialising in 
insurance law whenever the court was confronted with a new problem in the 
fi eld.9 They included such as John Dunning of  the Middle Temple, ‘one of  the 
ablest barristers of  the time’; James Alan Park of  Lincoln’s Inn, author of  A 
System of  the Law of  Marine Insurances (fi rst edition 1787); and Samuel Marshall, 
serjeant at law and author of  a Treatise on the Law of  Insurance in Four Books (fi rst 
edition 1802).10 Angelo liked to quote from the opinion of  Lord Hailes in one 
of  the earliest of  these cases, Stevens v Douglas in 1774, mentioning Dunning 
alongside, indeed ahead of, a trio of  leading English judges of  the period:11
We in Scotland are in the helpless infancy of  commerce. On a mercantile 
question, especially concerning insurance, I would rather have the 
opinion of  English merchants, than of  all the theorists and all the 
 7 The book was published in Edinburgh. 
 8 See the following papers by Angelo: ‘John Millar junior – a Biographical Sketch of  
a Minor Jurist of  the Eighteenth Century’ in A. J. Gamble (ed.), Obligations in Context: 
Essays in Honour of  Professor D. M. Walker (Edinburgh, 1990), 67–78; ‘Opinions by 
“Eminent English Counsel”: Their Use in Insurance Cases before the Court of  
Session in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries’, Juridical Review, [1995], 
345–64; ‘Insurance’ in K. G. C. Reid and R. Zimmermann (eds), A History of  Private 
Law in Scotland (2 vols, Oxford, 2000), II, 333–68; ‘“Calculated to our Meridian”? The 
Ius Commune, Lex Mercatoria and Scots Commercial Law in the Seventeenth and 
Eighteenth Centuries’ in E. C. Reid and D. L. Carey Miller (eds), A Mixed Legal System 
in Transition: T B Smith and the Progress of  Scots Law (Edinburgh, 2005), 120–37.
 9 An opinion by John Dunning, barrister, akin to those he and others gave in insur-
ance cases of  the period can be found in the Session Papers for the literary property 
case of  Dodsley v MacFarquhar 1775 Mor. 8308: see Session Papers, Advocates Library 
(Edinburgh), Campbell Collection, vol. 26, no. 78; Session Papers, Signet Library 
(Edinburgh), vols 166 (no. 7) and 347 (no. 2) 
  10 Forte, ‘Opinions by “Eminent English Counsel”’, 358–63 (quotation at 360).  Both 
the books cited were published in London and ran to several subsequent editions. 
11 Stevens v Douglas (1774) Mor. 7096; Fol. Dic., III, 328; Lord Hailes, Decisions of  the Lords 
of  Council and Session from 1766 to 1791 (Edinburgh, 1826), December 16, 1774.
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foreign ordinances in Europe. The opinion of  the English merchants 
is for the defender on the point of  law, without contradictory voice. To 
the same purpose we have the judgment of  English Courts, and the 
opinion of  an eminent lawyer, Mr Dunning. It is vain to say that Mr 
Dunning does not understand the law of  commerce: [...] Our Scottish 
insurances are copied from the English: for an interpretation of  words 
in such copy, am I to go the original, or the ordinances of  Amsterdam 
and Stockholm? I can have no doubt of  the law: it is the law of  Mr 
Dunning, Sir Joseph Yates, Lord Camden, and Lord Mansfi eld.
The practice of  seeking English counsel’s opinion faded away in the fi rst 
half  of  the nineteenth century as the expectation grew that Scottish counsel 
should be able to refer to and discuss the English position in an intelligent 
fashion; but there continued the sense that on insurance matters Scots law 
should not deviate too far from the law in England. Another of  Angelo’s 
favourite quotations was from the case of  Strachan v McDougle in 1835, where 
Lord Balgray said:12
I have some doubt whether the case should be decided with reference 
solely to the law of  Scotland. Policies of  insurance are a new species of  
instrument, which are of  recent introduction in England, and are still 
more recent here [...] I am doubtful, therefore, whether a question of  
this character should not be viewed as belonging to the law mercantile, 
and whether we ought not to see more of  the English practice and 
decisions in such cases, before we determine in this cause.
This all said, Angelo also recognised later that, at any rate up to 1800, English 
law was not the only source referred to in insurance matters. John Millar junior 
wrote ‘within the ius commune tradition of  scholarship’ and when he referred to 
English writers they were ‘those whose works conceived of  the lex mercatoria 
as based on the ius gentium and pan-European mercantile custom’.13 Counsel 
pleading in cases before the Court of  Session cited ius commune material as 
well as English decisions and writers; despite Lord Hailes’ powerful dictum 
in 1774, it was only in the nineteenth century that there was a decisive turn 
away from the law merchant in favour of  the Common Law of  England as 
12 Strachan v McDougle (1835) 13 S. 954, 958–9. The omitted passage is quoted below. See 
text accompanying note 76. 
13 Forte, ‘“Calculated to our Meridian”’, 126. 
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the primary point of  reference. Although the Marine Insurance Act 1906 
took twelve years to reach the statute book after its introduction as a Bill in 
1894, there does not seem to have been any controversy about its codifi cation 
of  English law applying throughout the United Kingdom, in contrast to 
what had happened with what became the Sale of  Goods Act 1893.14 Lord 
Balgray’s dictum in Strachan v McDougle, however, actually shows that the earlier 
approach, distinguishing between purely domestic law and the trans-national 
law merchant (of  which English law and practice might be powerful evidence), 
had by no means faded completely from view by 1835. I will return to this 
point below.
In his fi nal contribution on the eighteenth-century development of  
commercial law, Angelo extended his inquiry beyond insurance to bills of  
exchange, and sketched what he thought was a broadly similar picture of  a 
move away from ius commune understandings to an increasingly exclusive 
reliance on English authorities.15 Unlike insurance, of  course, bills were a 
well-established feature of  Scottish mercantile life long before 1707.16 The 
two editions of  William Forbes’ Methodical Treatise Concerning Bills of  Exchange, 
published in 1703 (Edinburgh) and 1718 (Edinburgh) respectively, well 
illustrated the ius commune approach to the subject in Scotland, within which 
English writings were to be seen as potentially indicative of  the ius gentium 
and mercantile custom, of  which the law of  bills formed part. By the later 
eighteenth century, although there was no practice of  seeking the opinion 
of  eminent English counsel in bills cases, ‘counsel were increasingly turning 
to English cases as primary authorities in their pleadings.’17  A hundred years 
later, the Bills of  Exchange Act 1882 codifi ed English law and with some 
minor amendments was applied to Scotland.18
14 See A. F. Rodger, ‘The Codifi cation of  Commercial Law in Victorian Britain’, Law 
Quarterly Review, 108 (1992), 570–90, 586, wherein it is noted briefl y that the Marine 
Insurance Bill ‘staggered uncertainly’ on to the statute book as the commercial 
codifi cation movement lost its impetus.
15 Forte, ‘“Calculated to our Meridian”’, 123-6, 128–36. See further on the whole subject 
A. M. Godfrey, ‘Ratio Decidendi and Foreign Law in the History of  Scots Law’ in 
S. Dauchy, W. H. Bryson and M. C. Mirow (eds), Ratio Decidendi: Guiding Principles of  
Judicial Decisions. Volume 2: ‘Foreign’ Law (Berlin, 2010), 81, 102–4. 
16 See e.g. Siobhan Talbot (ed) ‘The Letter Book of  John Clerk of  Penicuik, 1644–45’ 
in Miscellany of  the Scottish History Society (Woodbridge, 2014), 1–54, passim; and note 
the merchant Clerk’s reluctance to go to law in cases of  mercantile dispute (ibid., 33).
17 Forte, ‘“Calculated to our Meridian”’, 131. 
18 Rodger, ‘Codifi cation of  Commercial Law’, 578–9. 
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The process was also apparent in the work on the subject of  George 
Joseph Bell, who did not ignore the ius commune authorities but in general gave 
primacy of  authority to English cases; here following, Angelo argued, rather 
than seeking to lead practitioners. Indeed, as Angelo recognised, Bell himself  
counselled against excessive use of  English authority and the risk in departing 
too far from the ius commune as a result. But in this he was swimming against 
the current of  the times and the in-coming tide of  professional opinion and 
practice.19 Angelo narrated in his professorial inaugural at Aberdeen the lesson 
which he drew from the outstanding fi gure of  Bell:20
For me, Bell epitomises the genius of  Scots law, then, as now, with 
regard to commercial matters. It is a system characterised historically 
by a process of  what has been described as “willing borrowing and 
adaptation”. Bell’s objective in writing his Commentaries was to look at 
Roman law, continental jurisprudence, and English law, “all the cases 
and authorities with the greatest freedom”, in order to devise a rational, 
coherent, set of  rules applicable to a wide variety of  commercial dealings. 
No single component is regarded as being intrinsically more important 
than the others: although there is a clear and pragmatic realisation that 
in many cases it would not be prudent for Scottish commercial law to 
be too out of  step with that of  England. 
The other, more general conclusions which Angelo offered on the develop-
ment of  Scots commercial law were mainly in critical reaction to the views 
of  Sir Thomas (T. B.) Smith – and also, more mutedly, those of  J. J. Gow and 
Andrew Dewar Gibb – who in a previous generation had argued that the 
eighteenth century was the last classical age of  Scots law as a Civilian system, 
including its commercial law, with Anglicisation being primarily the result of  
interventions from Westminster in the nineteenth century, through either leg-
islation or decisions of  the House of  Lords. Instead, Angelo suggested, the 
process of  de-Civilianisation was ongoing and intensifying throughout the 
eighteenth century and was largely driven from inside Scotland, in particular 
by the bench and bar and also, if  more ambiguously, by legal writers and in 
particular Bell. 
19 Ibid., 133-6; Bell, Commentaries, I, preface, xi. 
20 Forte, ‘A Great Future Behind It? Scottish Commercial Law and the Millenium [sic]’, 
European Review of  Private Law, 2 (1994), 375–97, 383.
Commercial Law and Legal History 17
Widening the Scope of  Analysis
If  Angelo were here today, the conversation I would like to have with him on his 
view of  the history of  the development of  commercial law in Scotland would 
start from the observation that perhaps his evidence base needs to be expanded 
so that his conclusions can be tested more widely. While insurance and bills of  
exchange are obviously important commercial subjects, they are perhaps not 
at the absolute heart of  commercial law. Instead I would suggest that the core 
of  the subject is provided by the law of  sale and that nearly everything else 
in commerce revolves around sales. It is also an important point that bills of  
exchange and insurance were unknown to Roman law and (especially insurance) 
were relatively modern developments in 1700. The question of  where these two 
subjects fi tted into the Roman structure of  contracts which Scots law certainly 
had received by Stair’s time was one of  the diffi cult questions of  the late seven-
teenth and early eighteenth centuries, at least in Scotland. I will start with this 
latter point before turning to the former.  
We can tell that the Roman structure of  contracts had been received in 
Scotland by Stair’s time, because he spends a lot of  words in his famous 
chapter on conventional obligations rejecting, re-working or restricting it.21 For 
Stair, contract was based upon the will, or consent, of  the parties to become 
engaged to each other; in a memorable aphorism, ‘every paction produceth 
action.’22 The four categories of  contract in Roman law – ‘either perfected by 
things, words, writ or sole consent’, with only sale, location or hire, partnership 
or society and mandate in the last group – had been overtaken in Scotland, so 
that ‘not only these, but all other promises and pactions are now valid contracts 
by sole consent, except where writ is requisite.’23 This therefore covered the 
real contracts, under which a party had to hand over to another possession 
of  some item of  property as the fi rst stage of  performance of  the contract. 
Stair dealt fi rst with loan, where the receiver either became the owner but had 
eventually to return an equivalent (mutuum, particularly applicable to money), 
or simply a possessor for a time bound to return the same thing (commodatum, 
distinguished from location by being gratuitous).24 The other real contract 
was custody or deposit, under which the receiver held the property for the 
other party who, however, remained owner; the transaction was distinct from 
21 Stair, Institutions, I,10. 
22 Ibid., I,10,7. 
23 Ibid., I,10,11. 
24 Ibid., I,11.
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location in that the custodian had no right to use the deposited property while 
the owner had no obligation to pay for the service.25
Stair noted that the Roman escape route from the potential rigidities of  its 
categories had been the innominate contracts, 
which have not a special name and nature acknowledged in the law; 
and therefore oblige not by sole consent, but the giving or doing of  the 
one party obligeth the other, as permutation, excambion, or exchange, 
when either a thing is given for another, or a thing is given for a deed, 
work, or use, or one deed or work is done for another, for which the law 
hath no special name; and therefore names them, do ut des, do ut facias, 
facio ut facias.26
Unless one party had ‘given’ or ‘done’, the mere agreement to give or do in 
this way was nudum pactum and either party could withdraw or resile. These 
innominate contracts of  exchange could also be found in Scots law, and 
according to Stair included bills of  exchange (‘money for money’) and ‘the 
contract of  assurance, where money or things are given, for the hazard of  
anything that is in danger, whether it be goods or persons.’27 Perhaps, however, 
it was as a matter of  practical commercial reality that Stair dealt with bills of  
exchange in his chapter on loan as well.28  
Stair accepted that Scots law still had the Roman nominate contracts. But 
the only use of  the distinction between nominate and innominate contracts, 
he went on, was that while in all contracts parties had to perform not only that 
which was expressed but also that which was necessarily implied, the law had 
determined the implications of  the nominate contracts.29 The importance of  
this for bills of  exchange and insurance was that their effect depended upon 
the express terms of  the contract and anything further that could be implied 
therefrom; the law itself  gave no further guidance. Further, permutation – 
barter or exchange – was ‘congenerous’ with sale, and not to be regarded as 
any longer amongst the innominate contracts.30  
25 Ibid., I,13.
26 Ibid., I,10,11.  
27 Ibid., I,10,12.  
28 Ibid., I,11,7.    
29 Ibid., I,10,12. 
30 Ibid., I,14 (here departing from the Roman characterisation of  the contract as 
innominate: see further Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of  Obligations: Roman 
Foundations of  the Civilian Tradition (Cape Town, 1990), 532–7).
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Writing a generation later, William Forbes paid little if  any attention to 
Stair’s arguments about the basis of  contract and reinstated orthodoxy – the 
Roman structure of  contract law – with little qualifi cation. A contract ‘is an 
Engagement betwixt two or more Persons, effectual to force Performance 
by an Action’.31 Contracts are either real (‘perfected by the Intervention 
of  Things given or done’32); or verbal; or written; or, fi nally, ‘perfected by 
sole Consent’.33  Real contracts are loans, deposit, exchange or excambion, 
and (without any elaboration) insurance.34 The only contracts perfected 
by sole consent are the Roman group: sale, letting and hiring, partnership, 
and mandate or commission.35 Forbes then introduces a non-Roman mixed 
form, the contract ‘perfect, partly by Writ, partly by Consent’, and it is here 
that he places the bill of  exchange.36 Forbes thus had nothing to do with 
Stair’s innominate contracts of  exchange, made insurance a real contract 
presumably because the insured paid a premium for which a return would 
only be forthcoming upon events not certain to happen, and invented a 
new category – his one departure from traditional orthodoxy – to cover 
exclusively bills of  exchange.
Moving on another generation, Bankton, who in general followed Stair in 
his structuring of  the law, and did not treat the Roman law categorisations 
as defi nitive of  the Scots law of  contract, declared that the ‘distinction of  
contracts into Nominate and Innominate, is of  no use with us’, so that parties 
to an agreement for an innominate exchange were nonetheless bound by the 
agreement alone. The concept of  contracts by word was also not used in 
Scotland; while the Scottish rules on writing requirements were very different 
from contracts by writing in the sense of  the Roman law.37 But ‘contracts, 
perfected by consent, are governed mostly with us by the same rules as in the 
civil law’, the main examples being mandate, society, sale (including barter) 
and location.38 He also treated together the real contracts of  loan and deposit, 
separating them, however, with a chapter on bills.39 In Bankton’s view a bill 
of  exchange ‘is similar to mutuum [i.e. loan]’ but ‘partakes likewise of  mandate 
31 Forbes, Institutes, 183. See also idem, Great Body, f. 781.
32 Forbes, Institutes, 183; idem, Great Body, f. 788.
33 Forbes, Institutes, 184; idem, Great Body, f. 825. 
34 Forbes, Institutes, 185-91; idem, Great Body, ff.788–818. 
35 Forbes, Institutes, 197-207; idem, Great Body, ff. 825–77.
36 Forbes, Institutes, 207–11; idem, Great Body, ff. 880–98. 
37 Bankton, Institute, I,11,18–22 (quotation at 20). 
38 Ibid., I,11,63. 
39 Ibid., I,12–14. The whole of  ibid., I,13 is devoted to the subject of  bills of  exchange. 
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and exchange, and is a compound of  all three, and has something farther 
peculiar to itself.’40 Insurance, on the other hand, ‘is a kind of  sale, for thereby 
the assured purchases security to his goods for a certain premium given to 
the assurers’;41 and so Bankton treated the subject (at some length) in the 
same chapter as sale, i.e. as a consensual contract.42 Part of  Bankton’s method 
was to make comparison with the law of  England: of  insurance he wrote, 
‘the law is the same in both parts of  the kingdom, as being regulated by the 
mercantile law, which is part of  the law of  nations, and received into the law 
of  England.’43 Bills, he said, were ‘governed by the same law and usage of  
merchants in England, as in other trading countries, and likewise with us.’44
John Erskine was more like Forbes in dealing with contract law in a 
very Romanist way. He has only one paragraph on contract in general in his 
Institute, dealing with incapacity and invalidity by reason of  error, fraud, and 
force and fear.45 He then goes on, within a couple of  paragraphs, to describe 
the following particular contracts (loan, deposit, trust, and pledge), which for 
him are clearly the real contracts, as at the end he talks about the innominate 
real contracts, even although for him modern doctrines have moved on 
from Roman law: ‘By our law all contracts, even innominate, are equally 
obligatory on both parties from the date, so that neither party can resile.’46 His 
subsequent chapters become even more visibly Roman in their structure: the 
fi rst deals with ‘Obligations by word and by writing’ (which is mostly about 
writing requirements), and the next with ‘Obligations arising from consent, 
and of  accessory obligations’. The obligations by consent include not only 
the expected sale (together with permutation), location, society or copartnery, 
and mandate, but also, quite independently of  the others, insurance (as an 
aspect of  the location, or chartering, of  a ship).47 Erskine thus did not follow 
Stair, Forbes or Bankton on the categorisation of  insurance. Bills of  exchange 
are dealt with in a Forbes-like way, however, in the chapter on obligations 
by word and by writing, with Erskine seeing them as a form of  mandate, i.e. 
consensual, but always in writing, albeit informal.48  
40 Ibid., I,13,1. 
41 Ibid., I,19,28. 
42 Ibid., I,19,1–37 (permutation and sale), 38–46 (policy of  insurance). 
43 Ibid., I,19,19 (paragraphs 20–4 deal further with English law on insurance). 
44 Ibid., I,13, Observations on the Law of  England, 1.
45 Erskine, Institute, III,1,16.
46 Ibid., III,1,35.
47 Ibid., III,2,17.  
48 Ibid., III,2,25–38. 
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Hume And Bell
All this has been said to show how the classical writers on Scots law differed on, 
or even struggled with, how to fi t insurance and bills into their frameworks of  
the law, however orthodox or unorthodox they might be in their presentation 
of  these matters. These struggles came to a sudden end with the Edinburgh 
Professors of  Scots Law in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, 
Baron David Hume and George Joseph Bell. They simply by-passed the 
Roman structures and indeed, in Hume’s case, the idea of  any general theory 
or law of  contract as distinct from contracts.49 Bills and insurance became 
quite straightforwardly particular forms of  contract alongside sale, hire and all 
the others. As early as Bankton’s time, English law was being given attention 
in the exposition of  the law on both subjects, but very much in the fashion 
identifi ed by Angelo; that is, bills and insurance were part of  the ius gentium or 
the mercantile law, received in England as in Scotland, and therefore deserving 
notice by Scots lawyers. In Hume’s hands, however, discussion of  insurance 
required extensive reference to English texts and cases, quite outweighing the 
native material; but without any mention of  a wider legal background that 
might justify this approach.50 Again, but in notable contrast, in his lectures on 
bills, Hume’s predominant source by far was the Scottish case law, while the 
wider legal background, English or otherwise, was again practically ignored.51 
Perhaps for insurance at least Hume, occupant of  the Edinburgh Chair of  
Scots Law from 1786, would merit more attention as an agent of  the change of  
approach from talk of  English law within the ius gentium to simple deployment 
of  English cases and writers as the authorities to which reference had to be 
made for the law. But if  so, we might also want to know why, as Angelo did 
point out, he stopped lecturing on insurance altogether after session 1809-–10 
when he still had a dozen years to go before he fi nally quit the Chair.52  For 
both insurance and bills the key point is that Hume did not refer to wider 
notions of  the law merchant or the ius gentium. His focus was on the decisions 
of  the courts, Scottish and, where necessary, English.  
49 See further Hector MacQueen, ‘The Law of  Obligations in Scots Law’ in Reiner 
Schulze and Fryderyk Zoll (eds), The Law of  Obligations in Europe: A New Wave of  
Codifi cations (Munich, 2013), 213–43, 218–22; and more generally John W. Cairns, 
‘Historical Introduction’ in Reid and Zimmermann (eds), History of  Private Law in 
Scotland, I, 166–72.
50 Baron David Hume, Lectures 1786–1822 (6 vols, Stair Society vols 5, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 
Edinburgh, 1939–58, henceforth ‘Hume, Lectures’), III, 310–402. 
51 Hume, Lectures, II, 228–75.
52 Forte, ‘Marine Insurance’, 393.
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His successor cannot be simply lumped in with Hume on these matters, 
however. Bell did of  course refer extensively to English law treatises and 
precedents in his writings, and not just in relation to insurance and bills. 
But he explained his reasons for doing so, and also for referring to other 
foreign material, including in particular French and US law as set out in the 
great treatises and commentaries of  Pothier, Story and Kent.53 While he did 
not use or attempt to fi t Scots law into the Roman structures, Bell differed 
from Hume in standing fi rmly in the school of  the law merchant and the 
ius gentium.  He perhaps articulated and practised that approach more than 
any other Scottish lawyer before or since.54 It is apparent in the Principles that 
he produced for his students, while the Commentaries in particular are shot 
through with it. There can be no doubt that Bell sought to make Scots law 
fi t for a commercial and mercantile world. So he recognised a general law of  
contract and unilateral voluntary obligations (within which he placed bonds, 
cautionary obligations, bills of  exchange and promissory notes), and divided 
what he called mutual contracts into fi rst, sale, then hire, agency, maritime 
contracts and, fi nally, insurance. The structure of  the law was governed more 
by mercantile functionality than by Roman categories.
Bell may however have stated his approach to and understanding of  his 
subject most clearly in his last, indeed, posthumously published and so perhaps 
least-read, work, Inquiries into the Contract of  Sale of  Goods and Merchandise: as 
recognised in the Judicial Decisions and Mercantile Practice of  Modern Nations. In the 
introduction to this work, which appeared in 1844, Bell argued that the forms 
and rigidities of  municipal or domestic law were not always well suited to the 
needs of  commerce, and that in consequence rules and usages had arisen 
amongst merchants generally which had then been recognised by the laws of  
all commercial countries as the law merchant:55
53 K. G. C. Reid, ‘From Text-book to Book of  Authority: the Principles of  George Joseph 
Bell’, Edinburgh Law Review, 15 (2011), 6–32, 22–8.
54 Bell may thus have had a more activist conception of  the law merchant than Sir 
John Baker has argued was the prevalent view in England before, during and after 
Bell’s time: see J. H. Baker, ‘The Law Merchant and the Common Law before 1700’, 
Cambridge Law Journal, [1979], 295–322; John Baker, ‘The Law Merchant as a Source 
of  English Law’ in William Swadling and Gareth Jones (eds), The Search for Principle: 
Essays in Honour of  Lord Goff  of  Chieveley (Oxford, 1999), 79. See also Warren Swain, 
‘Lawyers, Merchants and the Law of  Contract in the Long Eighteenth Century’ in 
Matthew Dyson and David Ibbetson (eds), Law and Legal Process: Substantive Law and 
Procedure in English Legal History (Cambridge, 2013), 186. 
55 George Joseph Bell, Inquiries into the Contract of  Sale of  Goods and Merchandise: as recognised 
in the Judicial Decisions and Mercantile Practice of  Modern Nations (Edinburgh, 1844), 2. 
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Under this system, […] new instruments of  debt and credit are 
introduced in the form of  Bills and Notes, affording a rapid and safe 
mode of  transmitting money from country to country, and a convenient 
circulating medium among merchants. […] [T]he law of  Insurance 
gradually arises, by which misfortunes, from the dangers of  the sea or 
enemy, are mitigated; and losses, which would otherwise crush a single 
merchant, are spread among many adventurers, to whom they even 
become a source of  gain, while the merchant immediately concerned 
is rendered safe.
Elsewhere Bell had already argued that Roman law (‘nearest, perhaps, of  
any code of  written law, to […] universal jurisprudence’56) was not adequate 
for contemporary commercial purposes and that it had accordingly been 
developed signifi cantly in Scotland even where outright innovation had not 
been required as in the cases of  bills and insurance:57  
In Rome, commerce and its relations and facilities were discouraged, or 
not regarded with favour.  In the world as now constituted, they form the 
very object, and supply one of  the ruling principles, of  the jurisprudence 
of  contracts. Instead of  the amicable and gratuitous MANDATE, there 
has been introduced the onerous contract of  agency or factory, the 
relation of  principal and agent, imposing duties more imperative, 
entitling the principal to more entire reliance on the performance of  
his orders, and raising with third parties relations of  great extent and 
importance in trade. Instead of  SOCIETY, an arrangement merely for 
the joint management of  a common subject, the important contract of  
PARTNERSHIP has brought into combined operation, for the extension 
of  modern commerce, the skill, the industry, and the capital of  many 
associated persons.
In the Inquiries Bell went on to explain that while uniformity was desirable in 
the international and trans-national law merchant, it was not always achieved 
thanks to its inevitable interaction with municipal laws:58
56 Ibid., 6–7. 
57 Bell, Commentaries, I, 506. 
58 Bell, Inquiries, 7–8. 
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A concise view of  the differences which have thus arisen, and 
which sometimes amount to inconsistency, and are productive of  
embarrassment in their effects, may be of  use, not only in making those 
differences better known, but in pointing out the cause or principle 
from which they have arisen, or even, perhaps in suggesting some 
reconciling ground on which they may be compromised; and it cannot 
well be said that the Law-Merchant is a system of  universal application, 
till the great rules, in which all agree, shall be distinguished, and the 
exceptions and peculiarities marked out for observation. Such is the 
object of  this work. It is directed to an investigation into the differences 
which are to be found in different countries relative to the important 
contract of  Sale of  goods and merchandise; [...] my object being only 
to investigate the principles on which mercantile usage may be brought 
more nearly to a common standard in different countries. 
His study therefore extended beyond Scotland and England to the U.S.A. (where 
‘the Judges in the Supreme Courts, in determining any unsettled question in 
mercantile law, have examined, with a liberal and learned spirit, the principles 
of  Roman law, the doctrines and precedents of  the English and Scottish laws, 
and the authorities and decisions in continental Europe’59), and to France and 
Holland (which had specialist tribunaux de commerce subject to appeals to cours 
royals). Bell indicated that his intention was ‘to extend the inquiry’ beyond sale 
‘into the other branches of  mercantile and maritime law’;60 but the publisher’s 
prefatory note to the Inquiries tells us that while Bell ‘had for some time been 
engaged in the preparation of  a series of  similar Treatises on other subjects 
relative to Commercial Law’, the present volume was ‘the only one which he 
had fi nally revised for publication’.61 It would be a matter of  some interest to 
know what other commercial topics Bell proposed to address in the series, and 
how far his work on them had got before his death.  
Some Further Thoughts on Insurance
The confl icts between municipal law and the law merchant which Bell sought 
to reconcile can be seen in some of  the insurance cases reported in Morison’s 
Dictionary and discussed by Angelo. He noted that the earliest case in Morison 
59 Ibid., 6. 
60 Ibid., 7.
61 Prefatory Note to Bell, Inquiries. 
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was dated 1755.62 But, like Angelo, this reader’s impression from that and 
the later cases is not of  insurance as a novelty at that point. Merchants seem 
to be well accustomed to taking out insurance on both foreign and coastal 
or inland water journeys, with the underwriters being their fellow merchants, 
increasingly from the same port that was the insured’s principal place of  
business, although still sometimes also from places outside Scotland, whether 
in England or elsewhere. While Angelo may well have been correct to see 
the practice as having been learned from abroad, he was certainly right 
to see it as fully understood and established as a means of  risk-spreading 
between merchants in Scotland by the middle of  the eighteenth century.63 
There is also fairly frequent reference to brokers practising in Edinburgh 
and Glasgow to bring together groups of  underwriters for particular voyages 
while also gathering in from insureds the premiums for transmission on to 
the underwriters. The existence of  such brokerage businesses surely confi rms 
the normality and regular, ongoing fl ow of  marine insurance as an essential 
element in a burgeoning trading economy.64 A fi nal general impression from 
the printed reports is that many of  the cases come before the Court of  Session 
only after earlier proceedings in the Admiralty Court; so that marine insurance 
appears to be one of  the areas where in the later eighteenth century the Lords 
of  Session were asserting, by way of  various procedural and remedial devices, 
their superiority over the Judge Admiral. The confl ict would end only in 1830 
when the Admiralty jurisdiction was absorbed by the Court of  Session.65 The 
62 Lutwidge v Gray (1755) Mor. 7109 (taken from Woodhouselee’s Folio Dictionary, vol. 3, 
333–4). There is a problem with the dating of  this decision: see further Lutwidge v 
Gray (1732) Mor. 10111 (taken from Kames’ Folio Dictionary, vol. 2, 59), reversed by the 
House of  Lords (1734) 1 Pat. 119. 
63 Between 1766 and 1770 James Boswell was acting in a Court of  Session case about 
the insurance of  a cargo of  sugar consigned to Glasgow (from the West Indies?): 
Hugh M. Milne (ed.), The Legal Papers of  James Boswell (Stair Society vol. 60, Edinburgh, 
2013), 50–54. I owe this reference to Hugh Milne.
64 See Bell, Principles, § 219, 2(4): ‘Insurance-brokers are also special agents for effecting 
insurance, selecting proper underwriters, arranging the premium and terms of  the 
policy, and keeping an account on the one hand with the assured, and on the other 
with the underwriters, debiting or crediting each with the premium, as middleman for 
settling the payment of  it.’
65 Lord Cooper of  Culross, ‘The Central Courts after 1532’ in G. C. H. Paton (ed.), 
An Introduction to Scottish Legal History (Stair Society vol. 20, Edinburgh, 1958), 
341–9, 346–7. Boswell’s case (1766–70) had reached the Court of  Session from the 
Admiralty Court (above note 62). On admiralty jurisdiction before 1830 in general 
see now I. Maclagan, ‘The Maritime Rights of  the Magistrates of  Rothesay’ in Hector 
L MacQueen (ed), Miscellany VII (Stair Society vol. 63, 2015), 265–366. 
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lack of  Court of  Session cases before 1755 may therefore simply be because 
before that time disputes in this area were the unchallenged preserve of  the 
Admiralty or other more local courts.66
We can thus see marine insurance as something that had indeed been 
developed by merchants amongst themselves well before it ever came into 
serious contact with the judges, advocates and other lawyers who practised 
in Parliament House in Edinburgh. The sort of  confl ict to which this might 
give rise can be seen in Selkrig v Pitcairn and Scott, a case decided by the Court 
of  Session in June 1808 and one of  those in which the opinion of  English 
counsel was sought before the judgment of  the court was handed down.67 The 
dispute arose from the bankruptcy of  an underwriter who, in accordance with 
what was apparently universal practice, had yet to receive any premiums on 
certain policies that he had subscribed. The insured parties and their brokers 
withheld payment of  the premiums on the basis that insurance was a mutual 
contract, the argument being that ‘it is a general rule of  our law, that in a 
mutual contract, a party cannot demand implement of  the obligation de presenti 
of  the other party, if  it appears that he would not be able to implement his 
own counter obligation de futuro; and this rule equally affects those who, by 
bankruptcy, come to take the place of  either of  the parties.’68 The opinions of  
the English counsel consulted were clear that this would not be the position 
in England, with the reason being that the insurance policy signed by all 
parties stated that the premium had been paid, whether or not in fact it had 
been. Accordingly the broker’s debt to the underwriter was not conditional 
but absolute, and the unpaid premiums could be recovered by the bankrupt’s 
trustee.69 The debate then became one of  whether or not this was the result of  
66 Note the account of  the Admiral’s jurisdiction in William Welwood, An Abridgement of  
All Sea Lawes (London, 1613), 11 (‘all complaints, contracts, offences, pleas, exchanges, 
assecurations [emphasis supplied], debts, counts, charter-parteis, covenants, and all 
other writings concerning lading and unlading of  shippes, fraughts, hyres, monie lent 
upon casualties and hazard at sea’). ‘Assecuration’ is interpreted as insurance in T. C. 
Wade (ed.), Acta Curiae Admirallatus Scotiae 1557–62 (Stair Society vol. 2, Edinburgh, 
1937), xvii. See further Scott Styles’ contribution to the present volume.
67 Selkrig v Pitcairn and Scott 1808 Mor., ‘Insurance’, Appendix, No. 10 (31-9); F.C., June 
14, 1808. Note also the distinguishing of  the previous case of  Bertram v Richmond and 
Freebairn’s Trustee 1802 Mor. 7122, where the issue arose in the broker’s insolvency but 
the underwriter succeeded in recovering the premiums from the broker’s trustee. The 
opinion of  English counsel Mr Wood in this case is appended to the report of  Selkrig 
alongside those obtained from James Park, Sir Vickary Gibbs, and Serjeant Marshall 
in the latter proceedings (1808 Mor., ‘Insurance’, Appendix, 38-39). 
68 Selkrig, 1808 Mor., ‘Insurance’, Appendix, 33. 
69 The opinions are summarised at ibid., 33. In essence the doctrine being expounded 
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a general rule of  English law; if  not, as argued for the bankrupt’s trustee, the 
rule was ‘demonstrative […] of  the mercantile law of  insurance, which is not 
more the law of  England than of  this country’.70 The argument continued:71
By this mercantile law, the Courts of  Scotland must be guided in cases 
of  insurance, though it were contrary to our general rules relative to 
contracts; but in truth it is not contrary to these rules, since it only 
applies to contracts of  a form quite different from any of  those to 
which these general rules ever were held applicable.
With one dissent from Lord Meadowbank, the court upheld this argument, 
Meadowbank’s doubt being whether the general rules should yield to those of  
the law merchant given that actual payment of  the premium to the underwriter 
(as distinct from the payment presumed from the policy in the law merchant) 
had yet to take place.72
A similar debate took place nearly thirty years later in Strachan v McDougle,73 
the case in which Lord Balgray uttered his already quoted doubts about 
applying the law of  Scotland in an insurance case. The context in which these 
remarks can be placed should by now be apparent, and this is confi rmed by 
the facts of  the case and the decision of  the court. The point at issue was 
whether an arrestment of  a life assurance policy taken out with the Scottish 
Life Insurance Offi ce (later to become known as Standard Life74) could 
was that eventually codifi ed in the Marine Insurance Act 1906, s.53: see further 
Michael Lobban, ‘The Law of  Insurance’ in William Cornish and others, The Oxford 
History of  the Laws of  England Volume XII 1820-1914: Private Law (Oxford, 2010), 674-
727, 696-7. Proposals for reform of  s.53 were canvassed in Law Commission and 
Scottish Law Commission, Insurance Contract Law: Post Contract Duties and other Issues: a 
Joint Consultation Paper (Law Com. C.P. No. 201, 2011; Scot. Law Com. D.P. No. 152, 
2011), Parts 18-20.
70 Selkrig, 1808 Mor., ‘Insurance’, Appendix, 36. 
71 Ibid., 36. It should also be noted that the argument began with this proposition: ‘In a 
question depending on a point of  mercantile law, the desire of  rendering the decisions 
on our law here uniform with those of  the Courts of  England, where that law has 
been so much longer known, and so much more fully considered, has always been the 
paramount principle in the minds of  our Judges.’ (ibid., 36). 
72 See what may well be an eye-witness account of  the debate between the judges at 
avizandum in Bell, Commentaries, II, 116, note 2. Note also several references to the 
law merchant in Boswell’s pleadings in the Court of  Session in 1770 (above note 63).
73 Strachan v McDougle (1835) 13 S. 954. 
74 See Michael Moss, The Building of  Europe’s Largest Mutual Life Company: Standard Life 
1825–2000 (Edinburgh, 2000). 
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prevail against an unintimated assignation of  the policy where the document 
had been delivered to the assignee. To complicate matters still further, the 
assignee lived in Berwick-upon-Tweed and was domiciled in England where, 
according to her counsel, ‘in this and many similar instances, a right was 
effectually transferred, or a pledge effectually created, by mere deposit of  
the deeds constituting the right.’ The Scottish requirement of  intimation to 
complete an assignation, they argued, had no basis other than custom, whereas 
‘as policies of  life insurance were of  comparatively recent introduction, and, 
in some measure, belonged to mercantile law, it was unnecessary that there 
should be intimation at assigning them.’ Further, ‘the Assurance Offi ce never 
paid till the policy was produced, and therefore the reason for intimation, 
to put a debtor on his guard, had no application.’ Counsel for the arrester 
replied that the completion of  assignation by intimation was a fundamental 
part of  the law of  Scotland, and while it rested on custom, so did a very 
large part of  Scots law. Moreover, life assurance policies were not part of  
mercantile law, and the English law referred to was ‘highly injurious and 
much regretted’. If  the assignee’s argument was upheld, life assurance policies 
would have the same ‘extraordinary privileges’ as bills of  exchange and other 
negotiable instruments (i.e. be payable to bearer); this ‘would be contrary 
both to principle and expediency’.75 
The court held for the arrester and also rejected a confl ict of  laws argument 
that English rather than Scots law was applicable to the assignation. Lord 
Gillies was most worried by the possible effect of  a contrary decision that 
would make life assurance policies in effect negotiable, while Lord Mackenzie 
also thought that if  general Scots law principles were to be excluded by the 
law mercantile much more precise averments as to the law and practice of  
England and Europe were necessary. The Lord President was more hesitant, 
having in mind the insurers’ established practice of  requiring exhibition of  
the policy documents before they would pay out. Was there here a usage or 
custom of  trade capable of  displacing the general requirement of  intimation? 
Lord Balgray concurred in the fi nal decision in favour of  the arrester, but he 
also made some general remarks about policies of  life insurance:76
But they are a new species of  instrument which are of  recent 
introduction in England, and are still more recent here. But they are 
highly useful and benefi cial. They have become important from the 
75 All the quotations from the arguments of  counsel may be found at (1835) 13 S. 957.
76 Ibid., 958.
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extent to which the business of  insurance is carried on, and this is every 
day increasing; and I think the Court ought to view them favourably, 
and give every facility, consistent with law, to their transference between 
debtor and creditor.
In truth, the life insurance market of  the early nineteenth century could prob-
ably trace its beginnings back to the foundation of  the Society for Equitable 
Assurances on Lives in London in 1762, and was not so very new. But in 
Scotland, ‘after the Scottish Widows Fund formed as the fi rst Scottish life 
insurance offi ce in 1815, six fi rms appeared between 1823 and 1826, and some 
twenty more by 1848.’77 So it was indeed a recent and rapidly growing business 
phenomenon in Scotland in 1835. As the facts of  Strachan v McDougle suggest, 
life assurance was not just a means of  making individual savings and protecting 
the interests of  the insured’s family but also a way of  securing indebtedness, 
whether personal or commercial in origin. Hence, while there was room for 
doubt whether life assurance was as fully mercantile as marine insurance, it 
was certainly not an entirely personal and private matter between insurer and 
insured, cut off  altogether from wider business interests.
Other Mercantile Contracts: (i) Sale
A further line of  enquiry prompted by Angelo’s work on insurance and bills 
is what was happening in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries to the 
many other mercantile contracts in Scots law, notably sale, hire (location), 
partnership (society) and mandate. Can we see the same kinds of  shift 
and confl ict between the established Scottish common law and mercantile 
custom or the law merchant? As we have already seen, Bell certainly thought 
that by his time society and mandate had moved far from their Roman 
origins.78 While the replacement of  society by partnership awaits its modern 
77 Timothy Alborn, Regulated Lives: Life Insurance and British Society, 1800-1914 (Toronto, 
Buffalo and London, 2009), 25. See also Lobban, ‘Insurance’, 676-7, and other 
references there given. See further for Scotland C. W. Munn, ‘The Emergence of  
Edinburgh as a Financial Centre’ in A. J. G. Cummings and T. M. Devine (eds), 
Industry, Business and Society in Scotland since 1700 (Edinburgh, 1994), 125-41, 136-7, 
and C. H. Lee, ‘The Establishment of  the Financial Network’ in T. M. Devine and 
others (eds), The Transformation of  Scotland: The Economy since 1700 (Edinburgh, 2005), 
100-27. The fi rst Scottish case on life assurance I have noted is Campbell v Allan (1800) 
Mor., ‘Insurance’, Appendix No 3. The defender was an agent of  the Westminster 
Insurance Society. 
78 See above, text accompanying note 57.
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historian, Laura Macgregor has recently traced the development in Bell’s time 
of  agency, factory and brokerage alongside and, increasingly, in place of  ‘the 
amicable and gratuitous mandate’.79   Here I would like to look briefl y at 
developments in sale and hire.
As I have already suggested, sale in particular surely lies at the very root of  
commerce, and has always done so. How did sale and hire develop in Scotland 
during the period, and can we see there a similar or a different pattern of  
development to those found with insurance and bills? Another much missed 
colleague, the late Bill Gordon, has left us an overview of  the history of  sale 
in eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Scotland.80 He drew a picture 
in which a medieval customary law was gradually (but not completely) 
Civilianised, with Stair once again providing a signifi cant impetus in that 
general trend. After the 1707 Union writers such as Forbes and Bankton 
showed awareness of  English law in their accounts of  sale, but more for its 
differences from Scots law than as an authority to be followed or considered 
by the Scottish courts. If  there was reference in the eighteenth-century courts 
to English decisions or writers, Gordon does not mention it. Hume’s account 
of  sale is characteristically almost entirely based upon Scottish cases, with only 
glancing references to English (and indeed Roman) law.81 Bell’s Commentaries 
and Principles do however refer extensively to English law and cases along with, 
it must again be said, many references to Civilian and American sources as well 
as, of  course, Scottish cases and writings.82 It can be taken, therefore, that he 
was here following his usual approach as already described, looking to the law 
merchant rather than simply adopting English law wholesale. His posthumous 
Inquiries on the subject confi rm this preference.
The fi rst Scottish book devoted to sale was A Treatise on the Law of  Sale, 
by Mungo Ponton Brown, advocate, published in Edinburgh in 1821.83 
79 Laura J. Macgregor, The Law of  Agency in Scotland (Edinburgh, 2013), 49-80. 
80 William M. Gordon, ‘Sale’ in Reid and Zimmermann (eds), History of  Private Law, II, 
305–32, especially 305–19. 
81 Hume, Lectures, II, 3–55. 
82 Bell, Principles, §§ 85–132; Bell, Commentaries, I, 458–80. 
83 Brown is an obscure fi gure of  whom little is known beyond the production of  his 
treatise, perhaps because he died mid-career in 1832, sixteen years after his call to 
the bar. He was an Advocate-Depute in 1830. See Stephen P. Walker, The Faculty of  
Advocates 1800–1986: A Biographical Dictionary of  Members Admitted from 1 January 1800 
to 31 December 1986 (Edinburgh, 1987), 19. Although Brown was thought of  as a 
candidate to succeed Bell in the Edinburgh Scots Law Chair in 1827 (Reid, ‘From 
Text-book to Book of  Authority’, 7), that did not come to pass as Bell himself  failed 
to be appointed to the bench that year, and remained in the Chair until his death in 
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Brown stated that ‘[t]hroughout the greater part of  [his] work, the general 
arrangement of  Pothier’s Treatise on the same subject has been followed’,84 
hinting at a Civilian approach; and indeed throughout his book he cites 
Pothier (and quotes him in French), as well as the Digest, Domat and other 
ius commune authorities. But Brown’s Preface points up from the start what is 
really the book’s primary purpose:85
The Books of  the Law of  Scotland contain very ample materials for a 
separate treatise on the Contract of  Sale; and much valuable matter has 
been added in the course of  the last twenty years, in consequence of  
the practice which has prevailed so extensively during that period, of  
resorting for authority or illustration, upon questions connected with 
this branch of  mercantile jurisprudence, to the decisions of  the English 
Courts, and to the works of  English writers. This practice, while it has 
contributed greatly to supply the materials required for such a work, has 
at the same time rendered it more desirable and necessary; because the 
English law of  sale is, in some of  its fundamental principles, altogether 
different from the law of  Scotland, and unless those distinctions are 
rightly understood and kept in view, the utmost confusion of  principle 
must ultimately result from the indiscriminate use of  the English 
authorities.
 In the present work, an attempt is made to exhibit in a systematical 
form, the principles and rules of  the Contract of  Sale, as they may be 
deduced from books of  authority in the Law of  Scotland, and from 
the decisions of  the Court of  Session; and at the same time, by an 
examination of  the English authorities, to ascertain on the one hand, 
how far the doctrines of  the Law of  England upon this subject may 
be safely followed and relied on in analogous cases which may occur 
in our Courts; and, on the other hand, to point out the principles and 
maxims which are peculiar to the English law, and inconsistent with the 
principles and maxims which govern our practice.
The book begins with an ‘Introductory Discourse’, in which Brown sets out 
‘to state in general terms some of  the leading distinctions between the Scotch 
1843. 
84 M. P. Brown, A Treatise on the Law of  Sale (Edinburgh, 1821), vii–viii.
85 Ibid., v–vi. 
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and the English contract of  sale’.86 It is again worth quoting at length from 
the fi rst couple of  paragraphs of  this introduction:87
1.  It is obvious that the contract of  sale must be substantially the 
same in all civilized countries, in as far as regards its general character, 
and in the ordinary consequences which result from it. From this 
circumstance we are naturally led to expect that the laws of  different 
countries, in relation to this contract, should mutually illustrate each 
other. It appears, accordingly, to have been at all times the practice in 
our courts to resort for guidance and authority, in new and diffi cult 
cases of  sale, not only to the civil law, which in Scotland has been the 
chief  source from which the law of  personal obligations has been 
drawn, but also to foreign systems of  modern law, and to the judgments 
pronounced by foreign courts. In this way, the works of  the English 
lawyers in particular, and the judgments of  the English courts, have, for 
a long time, been allowed to be quoted in our courts, not only for the 
purposes of  illustration, but in some cases as authorities to be relied 
upon and followed in the same manner as the decisions of  our own 
judges. […]
 On the other hand, it is equally certain that, in a great many important 
particulars touching the nature and constitution of  the contract of  sale, 
as well as its effects, the law of  Scotland is different from the laws 
of  other countries, and particularly from the law of  England.—While, 
therefore, it cannot be denied that the most benefi cial consequences 
have resulted from the use of  the foreign authorities, it is evident at the 
same time that the use of  them must be kept within due bounds, and 
that unless it is restricted to matters in which the foreign law is truly 
analogous to the law of  Scotland, the practice now alluded to will have 
no other effect than to mislead, and to introduce both confusion in 
principle and practical injustice.
2. These last observations are peculiarly applicable to the law of  
England, because while in some respects that system is both more 
strictly analogous to our own, and much more useful as a source of  
authority than any other system, it differs in other respects from the law 
of  Scotland a great deal more than either the civil law, or the modern 
laws of  the continental states. As the English law, therefore, is by far 
86 Ibid., 3. 
87 Ibid., 1–2. 
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the most valuable source of  illustration and authority to which we can 
resort in points in which it is analogous to the law of  Scotland, this 
very circumstance renders it of  the greater importance that we should 
be fully aware of  the points of  difference. Unless these are clearly 
understood, the use of  the English authorities must, instead of  being 
benefi cial, become ultimately a source of  confusion and error.
So alongside the authorities already mentioned, Brown does indeed cite and 
discuss, often at length, numerous English cases; the list in the book’s table 
of  English cases stretches to four pages as against the fi ve for the table of  
‘Scotch’ cases. 
The fi rst point to note is how similar all this appears to be to the picture 
set out above for insurance and bills of  exchange. Reference to English law is 
justifi ed by the fact that in its essentials the law of  sale must be similar in all 
civilised countries, i.e. there is a ius gentium, or general mercantile jurisprudence, 
of  sale, of  which English and Scots law both form parts. In Brown’s eyes, 
however, the period since 1800 had seen a strong tendency to rely on English 
cases as authorities in their own right, rather than as simply evidence of  the 
ius gentium. It was not a tendency which Brown sought to resist, albeit he did 
seek to defend the principles and maxims of  Scots law by presenting them 
systematically and in comparison, where appropriate, with English law. The 
aim was further, not simply to avoid incoherence, but also to prevent ‘practical 
injustice’.  
The only problem with all this, it might be suggested, is that, by giving 
so much attention to the English authorities, Brown actually reinforced 
rather than redirected the trend which his book sought to channel. But on 
the other hand there is little sign of  the Scots law of  sale becoming closer 
to its English counterpart in the fi rst half  of  the nineteenth century. Bill 
Gordon at least saw ‘no change of  doctrine refl ected in the case law’ before 
the Westminster Parliament began to seek a more unifi ed treatment of  sales 
law in the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, Scotland, 1856, to be followed 
towards the end of  the century by the much more strongly harmonising (and 
Anglicising) Sale of  Goods Act 1893.88 Each of  these Acts is, of  course, an 
indicator that signifi cant differences did in fact continue to exist in the sales 
laws of  the respective jurisdictions. And it is still true that the Scots common 
88 Gordon, ‘Sale’, 323.  See further Rodger, ‘Codifi cation of  Commercial Law’, 
581–3. 
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law of  sale, applying above all to land transactions, differs from the statutory 
rules for goods.89 Perhaps, therefore, more research is required on the actual 
use of  English case law in the Scottish courts both before and after 1821 as 
well as on the sources and infl uence of  Brown’s treatise itself  to elucidate the 
character of  the development of  the law of  sale in this period.  
Other Mercantile Contracts: (ii) Location or Hire
Location, or hire, was clearly another very important form of  contract, 
covering, as Hume put it, ‘a variety of  the daily, and the most indispensable 
transactions of  life’.90 It embraced the hire of  things (locatio rei), that is, both 
land and goods, and of  the labour, work or services of  persons (locatio operarum). 
The parties were the locator or lessor, who let the thing or service, and the 
conductor, or lessee or hirer, who hired the thing or service. Most writers up 
to and including Bell agreed that location was very similar to sale except that 
ownership of  a thing let remained with the locator and did not pass to the 
conductor.91 Bell pointed out another difference from sale in that risk never 
passed from the locator to the hirer unless there was ‘a ground of  liability 
against [the latter] by reason of  negligent or faulty conduct’.92 There was some 
debate, never really resolved, as to whether the conductor/hirer had to pay 
a price in money or could supply some other performance in return for his 
possession and use.93 The Truck Act 1830 at least made clear that non-domestic 
servants – what Bell called ‘the hiring of  workmen in a manufactory’94 – had 
to be paid in money. Finally, location could be usefully distinguished from 
other contracts also involving the transfer of  possession: deposit, because it 
was gratuitous, and loan, either because it too was gratuitous when in the form 
of  commodatum, or because the borrower did not have to return the specifi c 
thing lent, as in mutuum. Location of  labour, work or services could also be 
89 Note A. D. M. Forte, ‘A Civilian Approach to the Contract of  Exchange in Modern 
Scots Law’, South African Law Journal, 101 (1984), 691–704.  
90 Hume, Lectures, II, 56. 
91 See Stair, Institutions, 1,15,1; Bankton, Institute, I,20,1; Erskine, Institute, III,3,14;  Bell, 
Commentaries, I, 481; Principles § 133, note.
92 Bell, Commentaries, I, 481. 
93 Stair, Institutions, 1,15,1; Forbes, Institutes, 201; Bankton, Institute, I,20,1; Erskine, 
Institute, III,3,14; Hume, Lectures, II, 59. Bell (Commentaries, I, 481; Principles §§ 133–4) 
is non-specifi c on the point. Note that the Supply of  Goods and Services Act 1982, 
c.29, s.11G(1), (3), allows the hire to be other than money (see also section 6 of  the 
Consumer Rights Act 2015). 
94 Bell, Principles, § 171; note also ibid., § 191 (‘workmen or artisans’).
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distinguished from mandate, since in the latter the service had to be provided 
gratuitously. Bankton also discussed the strict liabilities of  ship-masters, inn-
keepers and stablers under the Praetorian edict nautae, caupones, stabularii, ‘as 
a distinct contract’, while suggesting that their holding of  customers’ goods, 
‘being for hire, [...] rather resembles Location’.95 For Stair and Erskine, 
however, this edictal liability was an aspect of  deposit, while for Forbes it was 
quasi-contractual, arising from the presumed consent of  parties.96
Stair’s prime examples of  location were the letting of  land and work.97 
The same largely holds good for Forbes, Bankton and Erskine; their 
references on the subject are mainly to the Digest, with only occasional 
citations of  Scottish cases.98 Erskine’s treatment of  location as a distinct 
heading is however confi ned to moveables; elsewhere he noted that, while 
leases or tacks of  land were truly contracts of  location, they needed separate 
treatment because ‘they have by statute received special qualities which 
distinguish them from the common contract of  location’,99 the principal 
reason for this being the real right which had effectively been created for 
tenants by the Leases Act 1449. Hence he dealt with the whole subject in his 
discussion of  heritable property;100 the fi rst breakdown in the generality of  
the treatment of  location.101   
Bankton introduced a topic which had not been previously discussed at all 
as an aspect of  location in the major Scots law books when, in his observations 
on the law of  England in relation to hire, he considered mostly the strict 
liabilities of  the common carrier, that is, ‘all persons carrying goods for hire, 
95 Bankton, Institute, I,16,1.
96 Stair, Institutions, I,13,3 (see also ibid., I,9,5 (reparation), and I,12,18 (mandate)); 
Erskine, Institute, III,1,28; Forbes, Institutes, 213–4; Forbes, Great Body, fs 921–4.   
97 Stair, Institutions, I,15.
98 Forbes, Institutes, 200–1; Forbes, Great Body, fs 845-51; Bankton, Institute, I, 20; Erskine, 
Institute, III,3, 14–16.
99 Erskine, Institute, II,6,20. 
100 Ibid., II,6, 20–64. 
101 So Walter Ross later included a chapter on tacks in his Lectures on the History and Practice 
of  the Law of  Scotland relative to Conveyancing and Legal Diligence, delivered in 1783 and 
1784 and published in Edinburgh in 1792 (2nd edn, Edinburgh, 1822). Lease of  land 
was the only aspect of  location to develop as a monograph subject. George Joseph 
Bell’s brother Robert, a Writer to the Signet and later an advocate also, published A 
Treatise on Leases explaining the Nature, Form, etc of  the Contract of  Lease and Legal Rights of  
the Parties in 1803. The book ran to four editions, the last appearing in two volumes 
in 1825 (Edinburgh) and 1826 (Edinburgh). It was then apparently superseded by 
Robert Hunter’s Treatise on the Law of  Landlord and Tenant, which fi rst appeared in 1833 
and enjoyed three more editions, in 1845, 1860 and 1876 (Edinburgh).  
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as masters and owners of  ships, lightermen, stage-coachmen, etc’.102  He noted 
that the common carrier’s liability is 
a political institution of  the law of  England, that people may be safe 
in their dealings; and, if  it were otherwise, carriers, that are frequently 
trusted with things of  the greatest value, would often be tempted to 
confederate with thieves and robbers, and, on such affected pretences, 
defraud their employers.103
He then added:  ‘It is thought that this will hold with us [i.e. in Scots law], for the 
same reason, tho’ we have no express law nor precedents, that I know, for it.’104 
In his chapter on ‘the distinct contract’ derived from the edict nautae, caupones, 
stabularii, Bankton suggested that this strict liability extended to common car-
riers.105 Erskine too touched on this in his treatment of  the edict as deposit:106
This edict is, by the usage of  Scotland, extended to vintners in 
boroughs, though they be not innkeepers; Master of  Forbes, 17 Feb 1687; 
and to householders who take in lodgers: May, 10 July 1694; and would 
possibly, from the parity of  reason, be also applied against carriers.
Erskine also brought carriage into his account of  location, however, when 
he noted, almost in passing, that a contract ‘by which the owner of  a ship or 
vessel freights her to a merchant for the transportation of  goods from one port 
to another, for a certain sum, to be paid either by the day or upon the whole 
voyage, is a species of  location.’107  While hiring a ship could be seen as locatio 
rei, a contract merely to carry looked more like locatio operarum with, however, 
the additional feature that the locator also received goods (or, indeed, persons 
in passenger transport) from the conductor. This may explain the general non-
appearance of  carriage in discussions of  location up to the time of  Bankton 
and Erskine.108 Stair had touched upon carriage by ship in his account of  
102 Bankton, Institute, I, 20, Observations on the Law of  England, no. 2.
103 Ibid., no. 1. 
104 Ibid..
105 Bankton, Institute, I,16,5. Note also Zimmermann, Obligations, 514–26. 
106 Erskine, Institutes, III,1,29.
107 Ibid., III,3,17.  
108 But note Alexander King, Tractatus legum et consuetudinem navalium (1590), title 6 
(‘De locatione et conductione navium’), a reference I owe to J. D. Ford and his as 
yet unpublished edition of  this MS. treatise. In Roman times, carriage by sea where 
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mandate, noting however that ‘all Admiralties […] are proper judges of  these 
matters’;109 while Forbes put carriage by ship as another quasi-contract.110
Hume’s treatment of  location reunifi ed the subject by dwelling at length 
upon the tack of  land before turning relatively briefl y to locatio operarum, the 
use of  a thing or of  service and labour. He too treated of  carriage of  goods 
and persons by land, presumably a subject of  increasing signifi cance as the 
landward transport infrastructure for the country as a whole improved around 
him,111 before turning to a separate treatment of  ‘one instance more, and a 
frequent one, of  this sort of  location, – of  the use of  a thing’, carriage of  
goods by sea and the hire of  ships.112 Throughout his citations are to Scottish 
cases, with only very occasional references to Roman and English law. Hume 
followed Bankton in noting that the common or public land carrier’s strict 
liability had been adopted as a matter of  policy in Scotland and other countries, 
extending the principle of  the edict nautae, caupones, stabularii, but he doubted 
whether Scots law would go so far as English law in the celebrated case of  
Coggs v Bernard in making the common carrier liable even for the robbery of  
the goods being carried.113 England was thus the other country he had most 
prominently in mind on this topic. Alan Rodger as long ago as 1968 suggested 
that the development of  edictal liability for land carriers in Scotland came about, 
not by analogising them (as Bell and others were to do in the early nineteenth 
century) with nautae as sea carriers, but because inn-keepers (caupones) were 
the merchant transporting goods was not also the ship-owner seems to have been 
fi nanced by loans (fenus nauticum) to the merchant in which the risk of  failure was 
on the lender: Zimmermann, Obligations, 181–6. On arrangements in the medieval 
period see Edda Frankot, ‘Of  Laws of  Ships and Shipmen’: Medieval Maritime Law and 
its Practice in Urban North Europe (Edinburgh, 2012), 7–9; and for the early modern 
period see also J. J. Brown, ‘Merchant Princes and Mercantile Investment in Early 
Seventeenth-century Scotland’ in M. Lynch (ed.), The Early Modern Town in Scotland 
(London, Sydney and Wolfeboro, N.H., 1987), 125–46; P. G. B. McNeill (ed.), The 
Practicks of  Sir James Balfour of  Pittendreich (2 vols, Stair Society vols 21–22, Edinburgh 
1962–3), II, 618–19 (‘Anent frauchting of  schippis’; but note the reference at c.XXII 
to the master who ‘frauchtis or lettis to hire his schip to ane merchand’); William 
Welwood, The Sea Laws of  Scotland (2nd edn, Edinburgh, 1592), title 2 (‘Of  fraught-
ing of  schipis’); idem, Abridgement, title 7 (‘The fraughting of  ships’). On Welwood 
see further J. D. Ford, ‘William Welwod’s Treatises on Maritime Law’, Journal of  Legal 
History, 34 (2013), 172–210, especially 186.
109 Stair, Institutions, I,12,18. 
110 Forbes, Institutes, 196; Great Body, f. 924. 
111 Hume, Lectures, II, 100, 104–8. 
112 Ibid., II, 109–24 (quotation at ibid., 109; note also ibid., 102–3).
113 Ibid., II, 104–5. See also Coggs v Bernard (1703) 2 Ray. 900, 1 Salk. 26. 
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often also in the business of  hiring out carriages and coaches;114 but it may be 
that the English position, based as it was on public policy considerations, was 
the chief  infl uence in changing the law to meet changing trading conditions in 
Scotland during the second half  of  the eighteenth century.
English law certainly comes fully into view in Bell’s treatments of  what he 
fi rmly called hiring rather than location.115 As usual he cites English alongside 
Scottish cases, and also refers to Pothier’s work, this time mostly the treatise on 
the Contrat de Louage, as well as Story’s Commentary on Bailments and the relevant 
part of  Kent’s Commentaries on American Law.116 In addition he refers to Sir 
William Jones’ famous Essay on the Law of  Bailments for English law, remarking 
that in it Jones ‘has shown how the learning of  a scholar and the liberality of  
a gentleman may be combined with the correctness of  legal analysis.’117 Jones 
was also an admirer of  Pothier and a proponent of  natural law along with 
the idea of  law as a universal science, who could write of  responsibility for 
negligence in the contract of  bailment ‘that a perfect harmony subsists on 
this interesting branch of  jurisprudence in the codes of  nations most eminent 
for legal wisdom, particularly of  the Romans and the English’.118 There was, 
in other words, a ius gentium in this fi eld of  law. It was an understanding very 
much in line with Bell’s perception of  how the law should be developed in 
relation to mercantile affairs. 
So, on the responsibility of  the hirer for injury received by the subject 
of  the hire, Bell comments that ‘the doctrine maintained by Pothier, and 
114 Alan Rodger, ‘The Praetor’s Edict and Carriage by Land in Scots Law’, Irish Jurist, 3 
(1968), 175–86, especially 183–5. Note further Bell, Commentaries, I, 498: ‘Innkeepers 
are responsible, on the principle of  the edict, for whatever is placed under their 
charge, or that of  their servants […] Where an article is given to an innkeeper to 
be sent by a carrier or coach going from his house, he is liable for it. But it has been 
doubted whether, under this law, an innkeeper is responsible for a parcel addressed to 
one who was not a guest but merely called at his inn, and went on with post-horses.’ 
115 Bell, Principles, §§ 133–93; Commentaries, I, 481–505.
116 Robert Joseph Pothier, Traité du Contrat de Louage (Paris, 1764 and many subsequent 
editions; not translated into English until the mid-twentieth century: G. A. Mulligan 
(ed.), Pothier’s Treatise on the Contract of  Letting and Hiring (contrat de louage) (Durban, S.A., 
1953); James Kent, Commentaries on American Law (New York, 1826–30), Lecture 40; 
Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Law of  Bailments: with Illustrations from the Civil and the 
Foreign Law (Cambridge, Mass., 1832).
117 Bell, Commentaries, I, 483, note 1. Jones’ Essay was fi rst published in 1781 and had 
three further editions in England, the last in 1833. I have used the modern edition 
(based on the 1781 edition) edited with an introduction by David J. Ibbetson and pub-
lished as the fourth volume in the Welsh Legal History Society series (Bangor, 2004). 
118 Jones, Essay on Bailments, para. 17. 
Commercial Law and Legal History 39
vindicated by Sir William Jones, is the established law of  Scotland’.119 This 
was the doctrine of  culpa lata, culpa levis, and culpa levissima by which, where the 
contract was reciprocally benefi cial to both parties (as in hire), the possessor’s 
liability should be for ‘ordinary neglect only’; where it benefi ted only the owner 
(as in gratuitous deposit), the possessor should be liable for gross neglect only; 
and where it benefi ted only the possessor (as in gratuitous loans), the latter 
should be liable for the slightest neglect.120 Bell deploys this analysis in his 
Principles and his Commentaries.121
Bell’s treatment of  the praetorian edict is further indicative of  the general 
approach of  developing the law in mercantile matters to meet current practical 
issues identifi able through comparative study rooted in ideas of  the ius gentium 
and the law merchant. The edict takes liability beyond the realms of  the 
different kinds of  culpa, on policy grounds recognised ‘even in those countries 
where the Roman law has no avowed authority’, i.e. England.122 As already 
noted, on that basis Bell then applies the edict to the liability of  the land 
carrier by analogy with the liability of  the sea carrier.123 There is a more general 
observation refl ecting an understanding built on the ius gentium and the law 
merchant:124
This edict is not to be considered as positive law in Scotland, but as 
effectual only in so far as it has become a part of  the maritime law 
of  Europe, or as by its general policy it stands recommended to our 
adoption, and is now in its great principle recognised as a part of  our 
jurisprudence.
Hire remains unequivocally hire in Bell’s treatments, however, despite the link 
through Jones to the much wider English concept of  bailment, which includes 
but is not limited to hire.125 Bell covers the familiar ground of  locatio rei and 
locatio operarum. The latter is however broken up into a number of  sub-groups 
119 Bell, Commentaries, I, 483.
120 Pothier’s fullest discussion of  these principles is in his essay, De la Prestation des Fautes 
(usually found appended to his Traité des Obligations); I have used the edition in M. 
Bugnet (ed), Oeuvres de Pothier (10 vols, Paris, 1861), ii, 497–501. See also Jones, Essay 
on Bailments, paras 6–16.  
121 Bell, Principles, §§ 232–4; Bell, Commentaries, I, 483.
122 Ibid., I, 495. 
123 Ibid., I, 496.
124 Ibid., I, 495.
125 See further below, text accompanying notes 129–130.
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which appear to be of  Bell’s own devising. ‘Labour and service’ (which in turn 
is split into ‘common’ and ‘skilled’, the latter applying to professional persons, 
the former to the case where the workman is provided with the materials to 
be worked on, for example repair) is separated off  from ‘services’ (where the 
division is that already mentioned between the domestic and the manufactory 
servant); the distinction appears similar to the modern one between a contract 
for services and a contract of  service (employment). Carriage of  goods, 
including inland carriage, is another form of  hiring. 
The one point at which Bell appears to expand the traditional scope of  
location in Scots law is when, following Jones,126 he talks of  ‘hiring of  care 
and custody’. Although elsewhere Bell discusses the old gratuitous contract of  
deposit,127 the reality of  non-owners having the safe-keeping of  others’ goods 
for commercial purposes and commercial returns had to be brought within 
the scope of  legal analysis: ‘This is the contract which regulates the duties of  
depositaries for hire, wharfi ngers, warehousemen, livery stablers, and persons 
who keep depasturing fi elds for cattle.’128 Custody did however, like carriage, 
cut a slightly diffi cult fi gure as a form of  location; while the locator clearly 
provided a service, he also received possession of  goods from the conductor 
as well as the price paid for the service.
We can however see Bell deploying at least the idea of  bailment when 
structuring his account of  Scots law in cognate areas. In English law bailment 
(the etymology, according to Jones, being from the old French verb bailler 
meaning to deliver129) covered a range of  situations where property was 
delivered with the intention that ‘the recipient should have only the temporary 
use or profi ts of  the thing (loan or hire) or should hold it passively as a 
pawn or deposit’.130 Bell’s departure from the Roman structure of  contracts 
in favour of  a more functional approach based on commercial realities has 
already been mentioned.131 In his Principles, hiring was the fi rst of  a group of  
contracts treated under the heading ‘Contracts Accompanied by Confi dential 
Possession’, the remainder being, in order, loan, pledge, deposit and, fi nally, 
mandate and factory; that is, a mixture of  those traditionally considered as 
126 Jones, Essay on Bailments, para. 129. 
127 Bell, Commentaries, I, 277-8; Principles, §§ 210–15.
128 Ibid., § 155. See also Bell, Commentaries, I, 488. 
129 Jones, Bailments, para. 121. Bail is still the French for lease.  
130 J. H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History (4th edn, London Belfast and 
Edinburgh, 2002), 389. 
131 See above, text accompanying notes 53–57.
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either consensual or real.132 ‘These are contracts,’ Bell told his students, ‘in 
which there is necessarily entrusted to one the custody, or use, or manufacture, 
of  the property of  another; called Bailment in the law of  England and of  
America, but not distinguished in Scotland by any technical name.’133 In the 
Commentaries, Bell noted that the same group of  contracts were instances of  
property and possession of  things being in different hands, and explored 
the consequences in the bankruptcy of  the possessor, the general rule being 
that the owner could reclaim the property in question subject to any set off  
to which the bankrupt might be entitled. The exceptions were loans falling 
into the category of  mutuum, collusive sale and lease-back transactions, and 
the unpaid pledgee. But particularly in factories several nice points fell to be 
discussed in detail.134 While clearly in Scots law nothing closely approximated 
to the English idea that in some circumstances a bailee might have some kind 
of  proprietary claim to the thing bailed, it must be doubtful how far Bell 
would have been able to take the analysis just summarised without the issue 
having been put into his mind by the comparison with bailment.
Concluding Remarks
 The ruminations just offered are no more than a fi rst tentative toe in the water 
from one who, for reasons already given, does not much relish voyaging in such 
deep and potentially stormy waters. I have sought to take a little further Angelo’s 
basic point that in mercantile matters Scots law was developed through under-
standings of  a ius gentium and a law merchant for which the most readily available 
(but not the only) evidence was the decisions of  the English courts; a devel-
opment which became, despite resistance, a recognition of  those decisions as 
authorities rather than simply evidence of  some wider general norms. Further 
attempts to trace the eddying currents of  development in commercial law must 
be left to others better equipped to undertake the voyage. The project in which 
Angelo was very largely the fi rst adventurer, has, in other words, a long way still 
to go; and it is very sad that he will not be around to pilot it further across the 
ocean. But re-reading his work has reminded me of  many other good things. 
He introduced me to the verbs ‘to predicate’ and ‘to adumbrate’. He liked to 
be blunt and to speak frankly. He was fascinated by medieval law as well as 
medieval ships. His engagement with the Northern world of  Orkney as well as 
132 Bell, Principles, §§ 133–244. See also Bell, Commentaries, I, 481–545. 
133 Bell, Principles, un-numbered paragraph between §§ 132 and 133.
134 Bell, Commentaries, I, 274–88. 
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the Vikings in general led on to the late turn of  his work to Celtic law and the 
promising comparisons he drew between it and medieval Norse law. There was 
a very great deal about Angelo to love and admire; I miss his congenial presence 
and wide-ranging mind immensely.
